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Summary  findings
It is common  for central  governments  to delegate  Galasso  and  Ravallion  observe  that  the cenrer's  desire
authority  over  the targeting  of welfare  programs  to local  for  broad  geographic  coverage  appears  to have  severely
community  organizations  - which  may  be better  constrained  the  scope  for  pro-poor  village  targeting.
informed  about  who  is poor,  though  possibly  less  However,  poor  villages  tended  not  to be better  at
accountable  for getting  the  money  to  the local  poor  - reaching  their  poor.
while  the  center  retains  control  over how  much  goes to  They  find  some evidence  that  local  institutions  matter.
each  local  region.  The  presence  of cooperatives  for  farmers  and  the
Galasso  and Ravallion  outline  a theoretical  model  of  landless  appears  to be associated  with  nmore pro-poor
the interconnected  behavior  of the various  actors  in such  program  targeting.  The  presence  of recreational  cltubs lhas
a setting.  The model's  information  structure  provides  the  opposite  effect.
scope  for  econometric  identification.  Sometimes  the benefits  of  decentralized  social
Applying  data  for  a specific  program  in Bangladesh,  programs  are captured  by local  elites,  depending  on the
they  find  that  overall  targeting  was  mildly  pro-poor,  type  of spending  being  decentralized.  When  public
mostly  because  of successful  targeting  within  villages.  But  spending  is on a private  (excludable)  good,  and there  is
this varied  across  villages.  Although  some  village  no self-targeting  mechanism  to  ensure  that  only  the poor
characteristics  promoted  better  targeting,  these  were  participate,  there  is ample  scope  for  local  mistargeting.
generally  not  the same  characteristics  that  attracted
resources  from  the center.
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Community-level targeting of anti-poverty programs is now common. The center
delegates the taslk  of choosing program beneficiaries to ].ocal  (governmental or non-
governmental) organizations.  Proponents of such decentralized targeting have claimed that
more information is available at local level about who is poor than to the center, and that
local institutions tend to be more accountable to local people, and hence have an incentive to
use the locally available information to improve prograrn performance. These arguments echo
those commonly made for decentralizing other types of public spending.
The claim that more informnation  is available locally seems plausible, and there is
some supportive evidence (Alderman, 1998). However, the claim that local institutions are
accountable to the poor is more contentious. The accountability argument is persuasive in
settings in which there is little or no distributional conflict at local level; for example,
Seabright (1996) develops the accountability argument ifor  decentralization in the context of a
model of locally homogeneous communities. This is often assumed to be the case in
developed countries with seemingly low costs of inter-jurisdictional  mobility. 2 However, the
assumption of homogeneous local communities (and of free mobility) is implausible in many
settings in which decentralization has been popular, including underdeveloped rural
economies. 3 When local communities are not homogeneous, the benefits of decentralized
social progamns may well be captured by local elites.  This will depend on the type of
spending being decentralized. When it is public spending on a private (excludable) good, and
there is no self-targeting mechanism to assure that only the poor want to participate, there is
ample scope for .miss-targeting at local level.
2  Though  distributional  conflicts  arising  from local heterogeneity  can be expected  even in
developed  country  settings  with  relatively  free mobility  between  local jurisdictions  (Ravallion,  1984).
3  The existence  of strong and  persistent  geographic  effects in living standards  in developing
countries,  controlling  for observable  household  characteristics,  warns against assuming  free mobility.
For evidence  on this point in the same  setting as the empirical  work in this paper see Ravallion  and
Wodon (199SIa).
2Thus one can posit a potential trade off between the informational advantage of
community-based targeting, and an accountability disadvantage. The theoretical case for
decentralization will then depend critically on the extent of local program capture by the
nonpoor, as demonstrated theoretically by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998).
What does the available evidence suggest? There is anecdotal evidence of local
program capture of decentralized antipoverty programs and development projects. A well
known example (in the same setting for our empirical work) was provided by Hartmann and
Boyce (1983) in their description of how rich local farmers in Bangladesh were able to
capture a publicly provided (World Bank funded) local irrigation facility intended for poor
farmers. More recently, Participatory Poverty Assessments by the World Bank in Bangladesh
suggest that the rich in the community (the "matabbari")  tend to dominate the local power
structure; they tend to be the first, and possibly only, people consulted when a development
program is undertaken in the community (un Nabi et al 1999). Concerns about local capture
have sometimes influenced the design of anti-poverty programs; for example, Tendler (1997)
describes how drought-relief operations in the state of Ceara in Brazil included requirements
for broad local participation in allocating relief efforts.4
Such observations warn against assuming homogeneous local communities, and point
to serious accountability concerns about the case for decentralizing the power to decide who
gets help from an antipoverty program. However, the seriousness of these concerns cannot be
judged properly without more systematic evidence on the targeting performance of
decentralized programs; evidence on these issues has been known to be scant for some time
(Bardhan, 1996; Jimenez,  1999). The enthusiasm for community-based targeting in policy
circles has clearly run well ahead of the evidence.
4  Similarly,  the relative success  of decentralized  government  in the state of Karnataka  in India
has been attributed  to the effective  system  of democratic  accountability  (Crook and Manor, 1994).
3Thi  s paper tries to understand  the distributiona  L  outcomes  of a decentralized  program.
We take the existence  of decentralization  as given,  and focus on the factors  influencing
outcomes  f  or the poor. However,  the fact that the program  is decentralized  is crucial  to our
method. By building  the empirics  on explicit,  and  a p'riori  plausible, assumptions  about
information  structuires  we are able to identify some  key structural  parameters.
We motivate the empirics  by a theoretical  model  of the behavior  of the local
organizations  involved  in the micro-targeting  of an anlipoverty  program  and their relationship
to a central  government  that funds  the program,  and decides  on the budget allocation  across
local areas.  There is heterogeneity  and distributional  conflict  within communities.  The
allocations  are assumed  to be efficient,  but not necessarily  equitable.  The influence  of the
poor on outcomes  varies,  as do other factors  influencing  preferences  of both the poor and
nonpoor  and local budget constraints.  The model generates  equilibrium  allocations  of the
budget across  areas and between  poor and nonpoor  within  those areas.
We carry some key implications  of this theorel:ical  model to new data on a specific
social  program,  namely Bangladesh's  Food-for-Education  (FFE) program.  This is one of the
many  school-enrollment  subsidy  programs  now found  in both developing  and developed
countries. The official  aim of the program  is to keep ;he  children of poor rural families  in
school. Fi,xed  food rations are distributed  to selected households  conditional  on their school-
aged children  attending  at least 85% of classes. Participants  receive  the rations as long as
they send their children to primary school.  Over two million children  participated  in 1995-96
(13% of total primary school enrolment).  There is evidence  of s:ignificant  gains in terms  of
school attendance  with only modest  foregone  income through  displaced child labor
(Ravallion  and Wodon, 1999b).  However,  little is known about  how well the program  has
reached  the poor. Yes, there are gains from the program,  but are they gains to the poor?
4Armed with a rich data set at household  and community  level we study the targeting
performance  of this program.  There are two stages of targeting.  First economically  backward
areas  are chosen  by the center. Second,  community  groups-exploiting  idiosyncratic  local
information-select participants  within  those areas.  We address  two questions:
*  How much  of the program's performance  in reaching  poor families  was due to the
center's efforts at reaching  poor communities  versus  the efforts of those communities
to reach their own  poor?
*  What factors  influenced  the center's targeting  of communities,  and the distributional
outcomes  within communities?
We begin with our theoretical  model of benefit incidence  for a decentralized  program.
Section  3 outlines  properties  of our measure  of targeting  performance  and then goes on to
describe  our data for Bangladesh  and to present  relevant  descriptive  results. Section  4
outlines  our econometric  methods  for explaining  distributional  outcomes  of the program.
Our results are discussed  in section  5 and section  6 concludes.
2.  A model of benefit incidence  for a decentralized  social program
A poverty  reduction program  exists with a fixed aggregate  budget.  The program  is mn
by a Project  Office (PO) within  the central (federal  or provincial)  government.  The PO
decides  how to allocate the budget across  "communities".  People in each community  decide
how to allocate the PO's budget between  the "poor" and "nonpoor"  within that community.
We assume  that the program  does  not generate  spillover  effects across communities,  such as
due to mobility  between  them. 5 Mobility-induced  spillover  effects can be ruled out by
assuming  that the community  only makes allocations  across long-standing  members  or that
5  On the implications  of mobility of the poor for decentralized  social  programs see Brown and
Oates (1987)  and Wildasin  (1991). On how mobility might  impact on the local political  economy  see
Rose-Ackerman  (1983).
5there are costs of moving.  The PO does not observe  how much  is going to the poor in each
area, and has imperfect  information  on other relevant  local characteristics.
2.1  The local collective action problem
We assume  that the allocation  within  each community  is Pareto efficient,  in that it is
not possible  to increase the welfare of the  poor (nonpocir)  through the program  without
making  the nonpoor (poor)  worse  off. The smaller  the local  government  area that has power
to decide  w:ho  gets the program,  the more  plausible  this assumption  becomes. It appears  to be
a defensible  assumption  in the context  of the classic  village  society in a developing  country
where one finds quasi-cooperative  behavior  based on repeated  interaction  and shared
knowledge  accumulated  over long periods  of relatively  stable cohabitation. 6 However,  there
are circumstances  in which this assumption  will not hold, notably when program  capture  by
the nonpoor  requires  a wasteful  form of corruption.  The actual  institutional  arrangement
could take rmany  forms,  and we leave this open  - it might be a representative  village  leader
or a community  council,  or other delegated  non-governmnental  organizations.
As is well known,  Pareto  efficiency  in such a pr3blem implies that there exist
appropriate  weights  on the utilities  of the poor and nonpoor  such that the outcome  of the
collective  decision  rnaking  can be represented  by the maximum  of the weighted  sum of
utilities.  A special case is the utilitarian,  equal-weights,  solution  in which the al]location
maximizes  the sum of all utilities. 7
6  We  can  draw  some  support  for  this assumption  from  recent  empirical  work  suggesting  that
information  on individual  productivity  differences  is reasonably  common  knowledge  wvithin  villages
(Foster  and  Rosenzweig,  1993;  Lanjouw,  1999).  The  assumption  also  accords  with  experimental
evidence  suggesting  that  people  often  achieve  efficient  cooperative  outcomes  without  binding
contracts  (Dawes  and  Thaler,  1988).
7  One  can  motivate  a formally  identical  objective  function  by an "interest  group  model"  of a
local  politician's  vote  maximization  problem  as in Plotnick  (1986).
6While the efficiency assumption implies that Pareto weights exist, it does not throw
any light on how those weights are determined.8 They can be interpreted as the relative
power of the poor versus the nonpoor. This will presumably depend on the characteristics of
the poor and nonpoor (such as the extent to which the poor are literate) and local political and
economic environment, including variables that influence the reservation utilities of each
party, should no agreement be reached.  We postulate that all the exogenous variables of the
equal weights solution are potential factors influencing the weights appropriate to each
community, and (hence) which of the infinitely many efficient allocations will be observed.
The "poor" and "nonpoor" within the i'th (i=l,..,n) community receive per capita
allocations GP and  G7 respectively.  They have (per-capita) utility functions  UP  (GiP,  X)  and
U  (Gin,  Xi) respectively and these functions are strictly increasing and strictly concave in the
allocations received from the program, and vary with a vector of area characteristics,  Xi.  A.
proportion H, of the population is poor (giving the "headcount index" of poverty).  The
relative Pareto weight on utility of the poor (relative to the nonpoor), such that the outcome is
efficient in the i'th community, is given by A(Gi, Hi , Xi).  This is taken to vary with all the
exogenous variables in the collective decision problem.  We assume that the function A is
non-decreasing in G and H; either higher spending on the program or a higher incidence of
poverty in the village will enhance (or at least not diminish) the power of the poor in local
decision making.
Thus the community chooses  Gf and G2'  to solve the problem:
maxHiA(Gi,Hi,  Xi)UP(GIP,Xi)+(I-Hi)U  (Gj,Xi)  (1.1)
s.t.  HiG  j?  +  (1  -Hi )Gin  =  G;  ( 1.2)
s  In this respect our model  has a formal similarity  to recent  collective-action  models  of
household  decision  making  that postulate  an exogenous  "distribution  function"  that weights  the
7In addition  to satisfying  (1.2), the solutions  equate relative  marginal  utilities, UG /UP (where G  (wer
the subscripts  denote  partial derivatives)  with the relative  power of the poor A. We can write
the solutions  in generic  form as:
G'  G=  G(Gi,  Hi, Xi)  (2.1)
Gin  G' (Gi, Hi, Xi )  (2.2)
The difference  between  optimal  spending  on the poor and the nonpoor is:
jr  _ GP - G 1 = T(Gj, Hi, Xi)  (3)
We call this the "targeting  differential".  A positive (negative)  value of T indicates  that the
program  is targeted  to the poor (nonpoor).
This moidel  is too general  to deliver  many unarrmbiguous  comparative  slatic properties,
but some testable  implications  do emerge.  Consider  first the incidence  of an increase  in G.
Differentiating  the first-order  conditions  and solving  one obtains  (dropping  i subscripts  for
notational  brevity):
GP =[U'G-(1-H)AGUP]/J  (4.1)
G'  =( AUPG +H2GUGP)IJ  (4.2)
for the partial  derivatives  of (2.1) and (2.2) w.r.t. G, wlhere  J = I UGG  + A(1  - H)UGG) < 0. It
is evident from (4.1)  that G,P  is strictly increasing  in G,; the poor will gain from a program
expansion. However,  the outcome  for the nonpoor  is ambiguous,  In the special case in which
AG = 0, the nonpoor also gain from the expansion.  Mere generally,  however, the  outcome
will depencl  on how,  much a higher  budget  allocations  to a village raises the relative  power of
the poor. N9Totice,  however,  that finding  that G'  < 0 must imply that AG  > 0.
The effect of a change  in H is ambiguous.  Similarly  to (4.1) and (4.2) we have:
utilities  of household  members;  see,  for example,  Bourguignon  and Chiappori  (1994)  and  Browning
and  Chiappori  (1998).
8GP =-[TUG  +(l-H)2HUP]/J  (5.1)
GB~  =-[T2UG  _HAHUp)IJ  (5.2)
Consider  the effect of a higher  H on the per-capita  allocation  to the poor. Two opposing
effects  are evident in (5.1). The first term (-  TUGG  / J with opposite sign to T) can be
thought  of as a "budget  effect": a higher  H clearly makes  it harder  to increase the per capita
allocations  (to either the poor or nonpoor)  while  staying  within  the budget  constraint when
the poor are receiving  more per capita  than the nonpoor  (T > 0). The second term
(-(1  - H)2HU  ]  /J Ž 0 ) can be interpreted  as a "power  effect":  by increasing  the power  of
the poor in the community's  decision  making, a higher  H will increase their share of the
program's resources. The outcome  depends  on the balance of these  two effects. If T < 0 then
the two effects work in the same  direction  ( GI > 0). If T > 0, the outcome could go either
way.
Similarly  reasoning  applies  to the effect of H on G',  except now the power effect
naturally  works against  the nonpoor.  If T > 0 then a higher H will unambiguously  reduce the
per capita allocation  to the nonpoor.  The outcome  is ambiguous  if the program  favors the
nonpoor (T < 0).
The effects of changes  in X on the community's  allocation  are also ambiguous  in this
model. Consider  any element  of X that increases  the marginal  net gain from making  a higher
allocation  to the poor (i.e., it increases 2jUP - UG at given GP  and G"). Then it is evident
that GiP  will be strictly increasing  in that variable,  while G' will be decreasing. An element
of X that  jointly increases  the marginal  utility of a higher  program allocation  to both groups
will naturally  have an ambiguous  effect on the incidence  of program spending.
In this model, effects  on the relative  power of the poor in community  decision  making
can be crucial  to understanding  differences  in distributional  outcomes  of program  spending.
9Consider,  for example,  an increase  in income  inequality  between  t:he  nonpoor  and the poor.
At given A one expects  a partially  compensating  pro-poor  re-allocation  of progrram  spending
(given  diminishing  marginal  utility  of income). However,  it seems implausible  that higher
inequality  would  leave A unchanged;  more  likely higher inequalit-y  dissempowers  the poor in
terms of their influence  on collective  decision  making  wtithin  the village.9  Suppose  that the
income  of the nonpoor  increases  leaving  that of the poo:r  unchanged. The marginal  utility of
transfers  to nonpoor  can be assumed  to fall, while the marginal  utility  of a transfer  to the poor
will  be unchanged  (or possibly  rise). This will tend to increase the transfer  to the poor.
However,  if the higher income  for the nonpoor  relative  to the poor decreases  the Pareto
weight  on the poor then the effect on the incidence  of program  spending  is ambiguous. The
necessary  (and sufficient)  condition  for a higher  income  of the nonpoor  to result in higher
transfers  to the poor is that Ax  > (UG - AU  ) / U  in obvious  notation.
2.2  The problen facing the center's Project Officoe
The PO sets the budget allocation between communities, taking account of their
behavior. The center has its own weight on the poor 2 > 1, which it believes tc,  be higher
than many of the local Ai  's.  The PO does not, however, have the same information set as is
available locally. The PO has data supplied by the Central Statistics Office (CSO),
represented by the vectors  Zi for i=l,..,n  but it is impossible to infer  (Xi, Hi)  from Z,.  So
the center does not know how the community organizations have agreed to allocate their
disbursements between the poor and nonpoor.  We can write (Xi, Hi) = (Zi, 77i)  where 17,  is a
vector of random vaiiables unobserved by the center but with known joint distribution.
The project office's  allocations  G, (for i=1  ,..,n) solve the problem:
9  Bardhan and Mookherjee  (1999) characterize  the effect  of inequality  on the relative  weight  of
the income  groups in a model  of electoral  competition,  where the nonpoor  are organized in a lobby
and can make  campaign  contributions:  higher inequality  lowers the level of awareness  Df the poor,
decreasing  the,  level of their political  participation.
10max  E,4[Hi2  UP(GIP,  Xi) + (1 -Hi)Un(Gt",  Xi)|ZiZNi  (6.1)
i=l
n
s.t.  EGiNi  = G  (6.2)
i=1
where there are Ni  people in the i'th community, which is known with certainty. The center
also takes account of the fact that G/P  and Gn solve (1.1) and (1.2).  We apply the "first-order
approach" whereby (2.1) and (2.2) are used to eliminate  Gif and GQ"  from (6) (recalling that
(2.1) and (2.2) are the i'th community's  first-order conditions in explicit form).
In addition to (6.2), the center's first-order conditions require that:
E[HXUPGP  + (-Hi)UnGnIZ]  (7)
is equalized across all i at a value given by the multiplier on the center's  overall budget
constraint, denoted ,u.  Sufficient conditions for this to be the unique maximum are that:
E[HiXUPGG  (GP )2 + (1-Hi  )UnG (GGi  )2  + HiUGPGGGi  (2  - i )IZ]  < °  (8)
for all i.10 We can write the solutions in the form:
GSi  = G(Z;  ut)  (i=l  1_,n)  (9)
This can be thought of as the center's "payment schedule", giving its optimal outlays as a
function of the observed indicators at local level.
This model of the center's behavior is too general to deliver unambiguous predictions
about the comparative static properties.  For example, suppose that H is known by the center
and that the center does not attach any weight to the welfare of the nonpoor (2* approaches
infinity), so that the center aims to maximize the total gain to the poor.  Now compare the
Note that (8) implies that (6.1) is strictly  quasi-concave  in (G ,..,  G.).  Note also that (8) is
not implied  by concavity  of utility  functions,  which  implies that the first two terms in brackets  are
negative.  However,  the sign of the third term is ambiguous. A sufficient  condition  for the third term
to be non-positive  is that the marginal  allocation  to the poor does not rise as spending  increases
11center's spending  allocation  between  two communities  with different  values of H. There is
nothing  to guarantee  that the community  with the higher  H should.  get more from the center.
For a program  that i's  initially  targeted  to the poor (T0'), a center aiming to maximize  the
aggregate  gains to the poor will take account  of the fact that communities  with higher  poverty
incidence  will tend to make lower per-capita  allocations  to their poor. Whether  this effect is
strong  enough for the center to make  lower transfers  to poorer communities  remains  an open
question;  the answer  cannot be predicted  from the assumnptions  so far.
2.3  Relaxing the exogeneity assumptions
Two possible concerns  about  the above  model  relate to the exogeneity  assumptions.
The first is that we have treated  the center's  allocation  as exogenous  to community  decision
making.  Possibly  some local community  organizations  have greater political  influence  on the
center than others, which they use to increase  their allocation.  To allow  this possibility  in our
empirical  work we will exploit  the fact the nodel in the last section  implies that the center's
allocation  to any one community  will be a finction of that community's  characteristics
relative  to the  characteristics  of other  communities.  At the same  lime, the model of the local
allocation  problem  in section  2.1 has the feaure that only the comLmunity's  own
characteristics  matter  to the distributional  oucomes  conditional  on the allocation  received
from the center. Together,  these  theoretical  p;operties  imply  that the community's  relative
position  in terms of the center's allocation  crittrion  is a valid  instrumental  variable  for testing
the exogerLeity  of the center's allocation  to locd decision  making.
The seconcl  concern  relates to the possitility  thatinformation  supplied  by the local
areas  is endogenous. In the model  in section  2.2,  the CSO  monitors  a vector of exogenous
(GGIG  <  0) and that  no community  cares  more  abou:  tie poor  than  the  center  (X  2 A,).  In the
empirical  work later  we find that we cannot  reject  tlr lull hjpothesis that  GG =  0.
12indicators Zi  directly  for all i and the PO bases its allocation  on that data. The exogeneity
assumption  can be questioned  in three cases of potential  relevance  in this setting:
Case 1: one or more  elements  of Z may  be influenced  by the allocation  of program
spending  between  poor and nonpoor  at local level. The  center will then want to take account
of this effect in making  its allocation  across  communities.
Case 2: Z might include data that the CSO asks eaWh  local authority  to supply.  This
presumes  that it is prohibitively  costly  for the CSO to obtain  all its data directly;  it has no
choice but to rely on the information  supplied  locally.  This creates scope for the data to be
manipulated  by the local authorities.  The center will  then want to influence  local incentives
for providing  good data.
Case 3: The data available  to the researcher  on Z might  not be the same data that the
center based its allocations  on. For example,  the researcher  may be able to obtain more
accurate  data (not contaminated  by the efforts of lccal  authorities  to manipulate  the data).
Let us partition Z, as (Zli  , Z 2 i) where Z,i ale  endogenous  and Z 2i are exogenous.  We
may want to take  Hi to be an element  of Zli (with  iirther implications  for the analysis  in
section  2.1 that we will comment  on below).  Andwe  can assume  that Z2i  is a sub-set of
Xi which  is still exogenous  (and includes  other ,ariables  unobserved  by the center, in q,.)
In both cases above,  we can think  of Z,,as some function  of Xi; write  this as:
Z,i = Z 1(Xi)  (10)
This assumption  will help motivate  our  tests for  endogenous  data on the program's eligibility
criteria when we come to try to explain  the ceiter's allocation  across areas. In particular,  the
variables  in Xi that are unobserved  by the  centtr  will be valid instruments  for testing  the
exogeneity  of some of the determinants  of the  renter's allocation  choices. To help motivate
the assumption  in (10), let us briefly  ccnsider  iow it might be derived theoretically.
13Cansicler  Case 1. One can postulate  that  Zi is a function  of GP  as well as Xi.
(Notice  that if Hi is an element  of ZU  then the objective  function will no longer be additively
separable  betvween  Gf and G2. This would create  the possibility  of a higher  value of
Gi leading to a lowerG/'.)  G[ is in turn a function  of (Zli,  Z2i).  So we have a set of
simultaneous  equations  in Z,1 and Gil  for which (10) i;s  then interpreted  as the solution.
In Case 2, one can interpret  (10) as the solution  to a contract  problem  between local
authorities  and.  the CSO. For example,  suppose  that the CSO knows that the project office
bases its allocations  on both Zli  and Z 2i . To help assure  more accurate  reporling,  we can
assume  that the statistics  office  is able to impose  a penalty on local authorities  supplying  the
data. The penalty  takes the form of reporting  a likely offender  tc,  the PO, which then cuts that
conimunity  out of the program  with some probability.  The PO announces  that the i'th
community  will  receive G(Zli, Z 2i)  where  the function  G is increasing  in Zli .The CSO
reports likely offenders  with probability  1- p(Zli ) where the function  p  is decreasing  in Zli .
So the local authority  chooses Z 1i to maximize:
p(Ztli)  [V(G(Zi),  Hi,  Xi)  -V(O,  Hi,  Xi)](1
where V(.)  is thie  derived  maximum  of (1.1) subject  to (1.2).  We then assume an interior
solution,  which  will take the form in (10).
Combining  these observations,  Table 1 summa;rizes  how we will use the information
structure  in coamtmnity-based  targeting  as part of our identification  strategy.
3.  Descriptive results
3.1  Measuring and decomposing targeting perJormance
The strength  of association  between  poverty  and program  coverage is a natural
indicator  of the overall  performance  of an antipoverty  program.  'To  see how this can be
14formalized,  it is useful to introduce  some  notation for the classification  of recipients/non-
recipients  as poor/nonpoor,  as in Table 2.
Each household  who participates  in the program  receives a sum G. The targeting
differential  (T in equation  4) is the difference  between  the average amount going to the poor
(nfl  IG/n ) and that going to the nonpoor (nl2Gn 02). When expressed as a ratio to G, we will
refer  to TIG as the "targeting  coefficient":
T  =n,n22  - n2n2(12)
G  n.,n-2
This is simply  the difference  between  the fraction  of the poor who receive the program  and
the fraction  of the nonpoor  who do so. The targeting  coefficient  lies between  -1 and +1. If
the  program  is perfectly  targeted  to the poor (nl2= n2 1=O)  then TIG=l;  if the program  is
perfectly  targeted  to the nonpoor (nil= n22=O)  then T/G=-1;  a uniformn  ("untargeted")
allocation (n1 1 l/nj=nl2 1 n 0 ) implies that TIG=O.
The targeting  coefficient  is a measure  of association  for the 2x2 contingency  table in
Table 2. It is related to the "phi coefficient', a common statistic  of association  in a 2x2
contingency  table, and here given  by:
0  nl1n22 -nl2n2 l  - T  n.1n 02 (13)
In-fInZnln 20 2oG  2nl
(The necessary and sufficient condition for TIG =  0  is that (nlu  - n2 2)(  nl2-  n2l) = 0.) The phi.
coefficient  is related to the standard  chi-square  test statistic  for the test of independence  in a
contingency  table; in particular  N02  X2.  This provides a basis for statistical  inference
about  targeting  performance.
In a decentralized  program,  as in our case,  the targeting  performance  can be analyzed
beyond  the overall national  level. As out theoretical  model suggests,  the final allocation  is the
outcome  of different  layers of decision-making.  The performance  in reaching poor families
15can be disaggregated into an 'inter-village'  component, reflecting the center's efforts at
reaching poor communities, and an 'intra-village'  component, that describes the efforts of
those communities to reach their own poor. It is readily demonstrated that the overall
targeting coefficient can be decomposed into a weighted sum of within-community targeting
differentials and a between-community component, as:
TI  G)n.n'o2iNj  (nl,i - nl, )(n. 1 i - n  )N  (N14)
G  Nn. 1n.2  Na.^2
within  belween
communities  communities
where T  is the overall targeting differential, Ti is the targeting differential within community
i, N is the overall number of households and Ni is the number of households in village i.
3.2  The Food-for-Education program
FFE is implemented in two stages.  First, the participating Union Parishads (UP) are
chosen. (Al  UP is aL  local government area; there are about 4,500 in rural Bangladesh, each of
which belongs to a "Thana" of which there are 490.) 1,200 UP's were chosen to participate,
through a process that assured that all Thanas participated."  The stated aim is to select UP's
that are 'economically backward'  and with a low literacy rate. The selection is done by the
center in consultation with the Thana Education Committee and the minister in charge of
coordination of development activities in that area of the country.  The center controls the UP
selection process, though there is clearly scope for local lobbying to attract the program.
The requirement that all Thanas participate appears to be political-economy
constraint, whereby broad geographic spread of participants is deemed politically desirable.
11  Initially  one UP from each Thana  was selected;  450 UP's were added in the year 1994-95  and
extended  to an additional  250 in 1995-96.
16This is not uncommon in social programs.12  Naturally it constrains the scope for pro-poor
geographic targeting. We will see how much so later.
In the second stage, FEE households are identified within the selected UP's. Widows,
day-laborers, low income professionals,'3 landless or near landless farmers, and households
with school-aged children not covered by other targeted programs are officially eligible to
receive the program.  14 The program relies heavily on community involvement in the selection
of the households. The selection is typically done by the School Management Committee
(SMC); this is composed of teachers, local representatives, parents, education specialists and
donors to the school. The food is distributed by the SMC (or sometimes by the UP or a local
NGO). Each participating household is entitled to receive 15kg per month for each child
enrolled in school, up to 20kg for more than one child.
The empirical analysis will be based on the Household Expenditure Survey (HES)
collected in 1995-96 by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, following well-established and
credible survey practices, with support from international agencies including the World Bank.
The household questionnaire contains extensive information on household expenditures, and
has specific questions on household participation in FFE. A comprehensive consumption
aggregate can be formed from the data, including imputed values of consumption in kind,
valued at local market prices. We deduct the imputed value of the FEE transfer from the
consumption aggregate. A simple random sample of households was drawn from each
primary sampling unit (PSU) and a detailed community survey was done.  The PSU is the
12  See, for example,  the discussion  of the political  economy  of program placement  for an
Argentinean  program in Ravallion  (1999c).
13  Defined as fishermen,  weavers,  cobblers,  potters,  blacksmiths,  etc.
14  In particular,  the Vulnerable  Group  Development  and Rural Maintenance  Program are
government  sponsored  programs  distributing  food to the poor that are not compatible  with  the FFE
program.  The household  questionnaire  accounts  only for household  participation  to the FFE program.
The community  questionnaire  contains  information  on the presence  of the Vulnerable  Group
Development  (reported  positive for 4% of the villages)  and on other programs:  there are very few
villages  in which  the two sets  of programs  overlap,  so that the extent of potential  omitted  bias when
analyzing  the intra-village  targeting  performance  is relatively  small.
17"mauza",  which  is a compact  area of around 250 households,  forming  a single  natural village
in about 80%  of the cases;  in the other  cases the will contain  two or possible ffiree  natural
villages.  Wle  will  refer to it as a "village".
The program  reaches  25% of the villages  in the sample.  The percentage  of households
participating  in the program  is 9.8% for the whole samrrple,  and 410%  within  the participating
villages.  TIae  poor are defined  as those in the poorest  half of the national  distribution  of per-
capita expenditure  distribution  for rural areas (net of the FFE transfers).  This accords
reasonably  well with both official  and independent  estimates  of the poverty  rate in rural
Bangladesh  (World  Bank, 1998).
3.3  Measures  of overall  targeting  performance
Table 3 gives our results on the program's  targeting  performance.  Amongst  all
villages, 1  6% of the poor receive  the program,  as compared  to 4% of the non-poor;  in
participating  villages, the corresponding  proportions  are 55% and 18%.  So the aggregate
targeting  coefficient  is positive  in both cases. We are able to convincingly  reject the null
hypothesis  of independence  between  poverty  incidenc, and program  coverage.  Two thirds of
the overall  targeting  coefficient  is accounted  for by the intra-village  component,  and this
accounts  for virtually  all of the targeting  coefficient  for participating  villages. We repeated
these calculatic'ns  for two lower poverty  lines, namely  poverty  rates of 25% and 36%. The
same basic  pattern was found.
Performance  is heterogeneous  across  communities. A preliminary  description  of the
variation  across  communities  can be obtained  non-paraimetrically  by looking at how
incidence  varies  (unconditionally)  according  to observed  structural  parameters.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the poor benefit from an increase  in the budget
allocated  to the commnunity,  consistent  with our theoretical  model of the community's
behavior.  However,  the benefit  to the nonpoor  rises ornly  slightly and dies off at high levels of
18G, suggesting satiation. Under the assumptions of our model, this implies that higher G must
be increasing the relative power of the poor (section 2.1).  So marginal gains as the program
expands tend to be higher for the poor.  1
An increase in poverty incidence reduces the allocation to the nonpoor (Figure 2a),
but there is no sign of a systematic effect on the allocation to the poor. (There are too few
observations to estimate non-parametrically the responsiveness of GfP-n  to Hi separately for
TŽ>O  and Ti<O.)  Recall that our theoretical model allows either sign for the effect of Hi on
GiP  but Gi'  should  be decreasing in Hi controlling for Gi, given that the program is targeted
to the poor.  The negative effect of H on  G'  is confirmed by the data (Figure 2b).  There is
also a negative effect on  GP.
The empirical analysis in the next section will try to identify some economic and
social characteristics relevant to community decision-making, and those characteristics
responsible for attracting resources from the center to the comrnunity.
4.  Econometric models
4.1.  Modeling the intra-village allocations
Consider each community's  optimal allocation between the poor and nonpoor. The
empirical counterparts of (3.1) and (3.2) for the i'th participating village are:
G 1P = aPG +Xi  OP +  (15.1)
Gin=  a'Gi +Xi W +,:n  (15.2)
where Xi  is a vector of characteristics for village i.  Note that the regressions mirror the
'structural'  solution of the local authorities'  problem: they are both conditional on Gi, the
amount of the total budget allocated to the local area.  In keeping with our theoretical model.,
15  This  is consistent  with evidence  for other settings;  Ravallion  (1999) and Lanjouw and
Ravallion  (1999) find evidence  of early capture  by the nonpoor  for Argentina  and India respectively.
19we assume  that the center's allocation  is exogenous  (both  p and 5 '  are uncorrelated  with
Gj).  OLS  estimation  of the system (15) then provides  consistent  estimates  of the parameters.
The village  allocations  to the poor/nonpoor  G,P,G7  ar-e  estimated  only for G, > 0, i.e. for the
sample of villages participating  in the program. Under  the exogeneity  assum,ption,  there is no
selectivity  bias. We will however  provide  a test for exogeneity  of GI,  exploiting  the
information  structure  of our theoretical  model.
The  results on intra-community  targetipg  are presented  in Table 5. The eligibility
variables  include the proportion  of households  in the village  that are landless  (land  holdings
below 0.5 acres),  female  headed and widows or in lowv  occupational  professions.  In addition,
the average  number  of children  aged 6-15 for each household  in the village raeasures  the
population  of children  of primary  school age that are the prospective  EFE recipients.
The set of 'structural  variables'  in Table 5 aims to meas  are the level of 'economic
backward[ness'  of the village.  They  include indicators  for agricultural  development  and the
extent of diversification  into non-farm  activities,  the illiteracy  rate of the adult population,  the
number  of schools  in the community  and its population  density.  Access to credit is measured
by the presence  of the Grameen  Bank (a well known  group-based  credit program  providing
production  credit to the poor) and of the Krishi  Bank (a state-owned  agricultural  bank). An
indicator  for vvhether  the village  was hit by a shock in the previous  year is also included.
Shocks  encompass  natural disasters  (floods,  droughts,  river erosion, cyclones),  epidemic
diseases,  pest attaicks  and poultry  plagues. 16 A group of variables indicate  the degree of
openness/isolation  of the village  with possible  implications  for the bargaining  power of the
poor in community  decision  making:  these  variables  comprise  electrification,  presence  of a
telephone,  roa,d  quality, and distance  to the Thana headquarters  and to the capital, Dhaka.
16  Note  that  both  the  shock  indicators  and  the  number  of schools  are  aggregatted  in the intra-
village  targeting  regressions,  in order  to limit  the  number  of regressors.
20Two measures of inequality proxy for the balance of power between the poor and
nonpoor. Following the discussion in section 2, higher inequality may be associated with
worse targeting if the effect on the Pareto weights dominates the gains from reducing
inequality (given diminishing marginal utility of income). We construct two measures of
within-village inequality based on assets and income respectively: the interquartile range of
land ownership (the difference between the 75th  and the 25  centiles of the distribution) and
the Wolfson polarization index based on household net per capita expenditure.1 7
The community questionnaire offers information on various socio-economic groups
or organizations found in the village. Two distinct types of organizations can be identified.
The first are clubs that are used mostly for recreational purposes; they are typically accessible
only through user fees and tend to rely on financial assistance from patrons, mostly
businessmen and voluntary contributions. The second are cooperatives for the poor, including
the Farmers Cooperative Society and the B.S.S. (Assetless Cooperative Association).
We also use a measure of existing informnal  net transfers to the poor within the village.
Again, two arguments can be made as to why this might matter. On the one hand, the
pressure to target the poor using FFE  transfers will be less if the poor are already being
helped. However, on the other hand, a high level of transfers to the poor might reflect their
power within the village. In view of the potential endogeneity concern here, rather than the
level of transfers we shall use a dummy variable taking the value one if net transfers to the
poor are positive on average.
We forgo discussion of the results until section 5.
17  The results are robust  to alternative  measures  of land inequality;  we tried the Gini index and
the coefficient  of variation.  The Wolfson  index is not strictly  a measure  of inequality  but rather of the
extent  of "polarization",  interpretable  as how bi-modal  the distribution  is between  "poor" and
"nonpoor"  (Wolfson  1994). More precisely,  the index is defined  as W-2(g*-1pL)/m,  where  j.*  is the
actual  mean of PCE times 1  - Gini index,  gL is the mean  PCE for the poorest 50%  of the population
and m is the median PCE.
214.3  Mosdeling  the center's allocation across vil'lages
In modeling  the center's allocation  we allow the possibility  that the set of eligibility
criteria  (the adult illiteracy  rate, landlessness  and occupation  of r.he  head in certain  categories)
are correlated  with the error term (for the reasons discussed  in section  2.3). The information
available  to the center, represented  by the vector Zi, is partitioned  as (Z 1i, Z2 i)  in which
Zli =  Z, (X,)  are the potentially endogenous eligibility criteria, while Z2 i  (a subset of Xi)  is
a vector of exogenous variables.  The model is:
Gi =  Z 1iiA3  + Z 2J3 2 +  Ui  (16.1)
Z,i = xi 2 + vi  (16.2)
This simultaneous equation system is estimated in a Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) framework for limited dependent variables, following Smith and Blundell
(1986). We compare the results to a Tobit in which erdogeneity  is ignored.
Again, the information structure at the heart oi. a decentralized setting provides us
with the exclusion restrictions necessary to identify the system. As discussed in section 2.3,
the degree of inequality/polarization and the presence of informal transfers to the poor are
presumably common knowledge within the village, but are unlikely to be part of the
information set used by the center when deciding how to allocate the budget  across
communities. The set of variables deemed to be idiosyncratic to the local community (X P)
provides the instruments for the eligibility criteria.
4.4  Testing exogeneity of the center's budget allocations at village level
Our theoretical model, and the regressions based on (15), assume that the center's
budget allocation is taken as given in village level decision making i.e., that Gi is uncorrelated
with S  iP and/or  i  i  in (15).  To test this assumption, we check whether our estimated
residuals from (16.1) are significant when we add them to our regressions based on (15).  For
22identification  we again rely on the information  structure  of the problem, and use the village's
relative  welfare  ranking as an instrument,  as discussed  in section  2.3. Given that the center
aims  for broad geographic  coverage,  we use a dummy  variable  for whether  the village  is
relatively  poor within its region,  namely whether  average  per capital expenditure  (pre-FFE)  is
below the region  mean. Here we assume that villages know  the cardinal  value of their
average  wealth  but not that of competing  villages,  and that the ranking affects  the village
allocations  only through its effect on the budget  transferred  to the village.
5.  Discussion  of the results
5.1.  Targeting the poor within villages
The regressions  in Table 5 confirm  the bivariate  associations  in Figure 1, indicating
that allocations  to the poor increase  significantly  with an increase in the amount transferred
from the center Gi, consistently  with the theoretical  predictions  of our model of efficient
intra-village  allocation. On the other  hand, the allocation  to the nonpoor  does not increase
significantly  with a higher aggregate  allocation  to the village,  implying that the program
shifts the balance  of power within the village  in favor of the poor (section  2.1).
When  we add the residuals  from the first stage  Tobits  for G to the regressions  in Table
5, the t-tests  do not reject the null  that the center's budget allocation  is exogenous  at village
level. Other coefficients  and their standard  errors changed  little by treating Gi as endogenous.
Among  the eligibility  criteria,  villages  with a higher  share of households  whose head
is employed  as an agricultural  worker or in a low profession  are not more likely to target the
poor.  Villages  with a higher  proportion  of households  headed  by women or widows are less
likely to reach  the poor. These results are suggestive  of adverse  effects on relative  power
within  the village.
23There are significant  effects of some of the structural  characteristics,  suggesting  that
more developed  villages are more  effective  in reaching,  the poor. Multiple  cropping  is
associated  with better targeting  (Table 5).
Higher  land inequality  or income  polarization  within  the village  does not result in
better targeting  performance. This too suggests  adverse  effects of these varial)les  on relative
power of the poor, since without  such an effect one would expecit  more pro-poor  targeting  in
high inequality  villages.
The indicators  of existing  institutions  in the village  are jcintly significant  predictors  of
the distribution  of resources  within  the village.  There  is an indication  that the presence  of
informal  safety  nelts  targeted  to the poor is a substitute  for public  expenditures,  though the
effect is not strong.  The role of the civil society  in colective decision-making  is indirectly
captured  by the presence of recreational  clubs (more  likely to foster cooperation  amongst  the
non-poor)  and cooperatives  (more  likely to help the poor cooperate)  in the village.  The
degree  of local capture and leakage  of the program  increases  wich  the presence  of a club in
the community.  Conversely,  the targeting  to the poor, and the share of transfers  to the poor,
improve  when they are organized  collectively  in cooperatives,  though the effect is not
significant.
5.2.  Targeting villages
The results from the Tobit regression  of the allocation  of the FEE funds across
communities  are iLn  Table 6. The center reaches  poor areas  in some respects:  communities
that are relatively  poorer in the region, with low cropping  intenSity  or hit by a shock
(epidemic/pests)  are more  likely to be receiving  the program.  MIoreover,  the center chooses
areas where the Grameen  Bank is operative.' 8 However,  the presence  of the Krishi  Bank
weakly  reduces  the amount of FFE program  transferred  to the village: it may be the two
24public activities  are perceived  as substitutes  and that the center uses the total budget  to
maximize  geographical  coverage. There are other  indicators  going in the opposite  direction
and these account  for the weak inter-village  targeting  (section 3). Villages  with more  non-
farm activity  tend to attract  FFE resources. Areas with better irrigation  are receiving  more
transfers  from the center, not less.
We are able to reject the hypothesis  of exogenous  information;  the residuals  from the
first stage  predicted 'eligibility' criteria  are  jointly significant.  The measure of relative
economic  development  in the region  is significant,  justifying our use of this as the instrument
for testing exogeneity  of G in the regressions  for the intra-village  allocations.
6.  Conclusions
It has often been argued in development policy discussions that by tapping into local
information, a suitably decentralized antipoverty program will be able to help the poor more
than a centralized program; the decentralized program will, it is claimed, be better at targeting
those in need. Against this informational advantage, it is recognized that local communities
need not share the center's objectives for the program, and may be less accountable to the
poor. In attempting to understand distributional outcomes in this setting, our empirical
analysis has been motivated by a model of Pareto-efficient community organizations dealing
with a less well-informed central government that retains power over the inter-commnunity
allocation of spending, but has no ability to directly control distributional outcomes within
communities.
Informed by this theoretical model and our descriptive findings, we have studied the
performance of community-based targeting for Bangladesh's  Food-for-Education  Program.
To measure targeting performance, we have proposed a "targeting coefficient". This lies
18  There  is evidence that Grameen  Bank branch placement  is responsive  to potential  gains to the
poor (Ravallion  and Wodon, 1999c).
25between  minus one (when  the program  is perfectly  targeted  to the nonpoor)  and.  plus one
(when  it is perfectly  targeted  to the poor), with a value cf zero indicating  that the poor and
nonpoor  are equally  likely to get the program.  We find that the program's transfers are well
targeted  to the poor, in that a higher  proportion  of the pcor receive  help than do the nonpoor.
The difference  is substantial;  the estimated  targeting  coefficient  is 0.12 and the association
between  program.  placement  and poverty  is statistically  significant.
We find that most of this pro-poor  overall targeting  performiance  was due to pro-poor
targeting  within villages.  The center's targeting  of villages  contributed  less to overall
targeting  performance  than intra-village  targeting.  Clearly, the cenl:er's  desire  to assure  broad
geographic  coverage  of the program  constrained  the scope for pro-poor village  targeting.
Targeting  performance  varied greatly between  villages, and!  we have tried to explain
why.  We cannot  reject the null that the center's allocation  across  villages is exogenous  to the
intra-village  decision.  making  on who gets the program.  Comparing  villages  with different
allocations  from the program,  we find that the proportion  of the poor receiving  the program
increases  as the program  expands,  but the proportion  of the nonpoCo  benefiting  from the
program  does not. These findings  are suggestive  of a "early capture" of the program  by the
non-poor;  targetirng  performance  improves  as the prograin  expands, and worsens when  it
contracts.  While there is pro-poor  targeting  within  villages,  the program's official  eligibility
criteria  at village  level turn out to be rather weak indicators  of inter-village  differences  in
performance. Controlling  for the center's allocation,  there is a tendtency  for poo:rer  villages to
be less effective  at reaching their poor. This is indicated  by the village  poverty  rate and by
some of its likely determinants,  such as the extent of multiple  cropping. So our results lead
us to question  whether  more pro-poor  targeting  of villages by the center would in fact be
poverty  reducing.
26Our  results are suggestive  of effects  on the relative  power of the poor in local decision
making.  For example,  we find that more unequal  villages are no better at targeting  the poor
through  the program.  This is not what one would expect to find with fixed Pareto weights.
We infer that higher inequality  comes  with lower power for the poor in village decision
making,  so the nonpoor  are able to capture the benefits of this antipoverty  program. There is
no sign here of a self-correcting  mechanism  whereby  community-based  targeting  allows the
program  to reach the poor better in highly  unequal  villages.  There is, however, evidence  of
substitution  between  private and public transfers;  villages  in which there are already  transfers
to the poor tend  to be ones in which the program's resources  go relatively more to the
nonpoor.
We also find some evidence  that local village  institutions  matters, though  they are not
necessarily  pro-poor. The presence  of cooperatives  for farmers and the landless does appear
to be associated  with more pro-poor  targeting  of this program.  However,  the presence  of
recreational  clubs-which  probably  reflect,  and help build,  the social capital of the
nonpoor-has  the opposite  effect.
A number  of factors appear  to have influenced  the center's allocation across  villages,
including  the official  eligibility  criteria. There is evidence  that some of the data on eligibility
criteria  used by the center are endogenous;  this could  be purposive  manipulation,  real
feedback  effects or simply the fact that our data differ  from those actually  used in targeting.
Partially  offsetting  this, controlling  for eligibility,  the center appears  also to have been
attracted  by more  developed villages  such as those with more irrigation,  and more  non-farrn
activities.  Overall,  there is not much agreement  between  the village  characteristics  that
attracted  the program  and those that enhanced  performance  at reaching the poor.
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31Table 1: lIformation  structure and identification
Observed  by:  Examples  Identifies  exogenous  variation  in:
Center  community
Yes  yes  Commonly  known data such as
from the census
Yes  no  Community's  relative  position  center's allocation across
on eligibility  criteria  communities  when explaining
local targeting
No  yes  Inequality  within the village;  potentially  endogenous  data on





Program?  Yes  nil  nl2  P = nl°
N4  021  n2l  1 ,P=  n20
H=noI  1-H=nl2  1
Table 3: T'he  targeting performance of the FFE program
GP  _n  _  G"  n_  2  T  Intra-  Inter-  o  prob.
G  n.,  G  n.,  G  village  village  value
All villages  0.157  0.037  0.120  0.076  0.044  0.041  0.000
Participating  villages  0.548  0.180  0.368  0.319  0.049  0.136  0.000
only
32Table 4: Descriptive  statistics
Mean  Std. dev.
Land  ownership:  Fraction  landless  0.115  0.142
Fraction near-landless  0.376  0.173
Occupation head:  Agricultural workers  0.195  0.153
Low  profession  0.075  0.101
Fraction female/widow heads  0.037  0.053
Average  number  children  aged  6-15  2.146  0.382
Number of schools:  Government  3.017  1.251
Private  0.317  0.659
NGO  0.167  0.454
Religious (Madrasha)  0.246  0.431
% irrigated  area  0.453  0.313
Cropping  intensity:  1 crop/year  0.308  0.272
Main  activity  in village:  non-agriculture  0.472  0.500
Main activity females in the village: non-agriculture  0.247  0.432
Illiteracy  rate  adults  0.597  0.175
Expenditure  per member  611.523  164.35
Krishi  Bank in the village  0.054  0.227
Grameen Bank in the village  0.047  0.212
Shock:  natural  disaster  0.754  0.431
Shock: epidemic/pests  0.717  0.452
Village  area/no.households  (in acres)  1.518  0.981
Road to the village unpaved  0.579  0.495
Distance to Thana (in miles)  8.100  4.955
Distance  to Dhaka  (in miles)  156.838  89.303
Village  is electrified  0.471  0.500
Telephone  in the village  0.075  0.264
Club/recreation  in village  0.441  0.498
Farmers/poor Cooperative Society in village  0.504  0.501
Average net transfers received by the  0.345  0.476
poor>O
Inter-quartile range of landholdings  1.444  1.032
Polarization  index  0.266  0.099
Gini index  0.268  0.075
33Table 5: Initra-conimunity  targeting performance
Ti  G]P  G n
Budget allocation  Gi  0.946'*  1.125**  0.178
(4.55)  (6.89)  (1.35)
Eligibility:
Fraction landless  0.249  0.165  -0.085
(0.69)  (0.60)  (0.40)
Fraction near-landless  -0.285  -0.043  0.243
(1.14)  (0.26)  (1.44)
Fraction heads - low p:rofession  0.125  0.118  -0.007
(0.23)  (0.35)  (0.02)
Fraction  heads  - agricultural  workers  0.111  -0.292  -0.403
(0.38)  (1.38)  (2.05)
Fraction  heads  - female/widows  -1.013  -0.786*  0.227
(1.22)  (1.81)  (0.32)
Average number children aged 6-15  0.015  0.012  -0.002
(0.16)  (0.28)  (0.03)
Structural
Number of schools in village  -0.029  -0.013  0.016
(0.63)  (0.40)  (0.56)
Main activity: NAG  0.013  -0.006  -0.019
(0.17)  (0.11)  (0.30)
Main activity wonen:  NAG  -0.022  0.107  0.13
(0.19)  (1.48)  (1.64)
Area village per household  0.073  0.009  -0.065
(1.07)  (0.15)  (1.59)
Cropping intensity: 1 c  rop/year  -0,372  -. 0.129  0.243
(2.11)  (0.98)  (2.61)
% irrigated area  -0,002  .0.001  0.002
(1.24)  (0.60)  (1.50)
Grameen Bank in the village  0.014  -0.031  -0.045
(0.11)  (0.29)  (0.55)
Krishi Bank in the village  -0.129  .0.056  0.072
(0.61)  (0.39)  (0.40)
Shock in past 12 months  -0.092  -0.047  0.045
(G.42)  (0.51)  (0.23)
Illiteracy rate for adults  -0.265  -0.052  0.213
(1.19)  (0.35)  (1.14)
Modernization/openness
Road to the village unpaved  0.023  0.028  0.004
(0.24)  (0.36)  (0.08)
Telephone in the village  0.099  0.057  -0.043
(0.51)  (0.48)  (0.33)
Village electrified  -0.011  -0.052  -0.041
(0.15)  (1.10)  (0.80)
Distance to Thana  -0.008  -0.002  0.006
(1.11)  (0.43)  (1.31)
Distance to Ehaka  0  0  0
(0.32)  (0.94)  (0.81)
Inegualit
Interquartile range land  -0.025  -0.014  0.01
(0.72)  (0.73)  (0.41)
34Wolfson  polarization  index  0.045  0.028  -0.017
(0.41)  (0.35)  (0 16)
Institutions
Avg  net transfers  to the poor>O  -0.087  -0.104  -0.016
(0.96)  (1.52)  (0.28)
Poor  Cooperative  Society  -0.001  0.041  0.042
(0.02)  (0.79)  (0.72)
Club/recreation  in village  -0.199-  -0.059  0.139'-
(2.86)  (0.99)  (2.37)
Constant  0.73  0.438  -0.292
(1.65)  (1.54)  (0.89)
R 2  0.85  0.95  0.8
N. obs.  45  45  45
F-test joint significance:
(p-value)
Eligibility  0.655  0.368  0.277
Structural  0.454  0.308  0.145
Modernization  0.726  0.501  0.555
Inequality  0.691  0.758  0.888
Institutions  0.057  0.498  0.067-
All  0.0  0.00  0.0028
Note: The t-tests of the residuals  from the 1St stage LIML (testing  for endogeneity  of G) are 0.002,1.09
and  1.09  for T, (',  G' respectively.  The F-test for the joint significance of the interaction effects
(GP/G  on the whole set of regressors)  is F( 27, 17)  = 1.71,  p-value  0.126.
35Table 6: hnter-community incidence of program spending
Community  Budget
selecti  on  allocation
Prc'bit  Tobit  IJML
Eligibilit
Fraction landless/near-landless  0.484  0.151  1.525
(0.79)  (0.64)  (1.25)
Residual  land')  -1.400
(1.08)
Adult illiteracy  -0.408  -0.033  -4.103
(0.52)  (0.09)  (2.10)
Residual  adult  illiteracyl)  4.166-
(2.14)
Heads - low profession/agricultural workers  1.304  0.629  4.985
(1.35)  (1.57)  (3.82)
Residual  low profession(])  -4 686-
(3.51)
Fraction heads - female widows  0.961  D.607  1,425
(('.36)  (0.49)  (1.11)
Average number children aged 6-15  0.052  0.037  0.061
((1.19)  (0.30)  (0.40)
Net PCE village<:avg  net PCE in the region  0.373  0.206**  0.205
(1.55)  (1.93)  (1.99)
Number of schools:
Govemmenc  0.D05  -0.014  -0.038
(0.05)  (0.27)  (0.56)
Private  0.179  0.055  0.165
((1.94)  (0.66)  d.1.71)
NGO  -0.07  -0.059  -0.264
(0).22)  (0.44)  ( 1.76)
Religious (Madrasha)  -0.186  -0.067  -C.232
(0.68)  (0.56)  J1.68)
Structural
Main economic activity: NAG  0.696*  0.314-  0.019
(Z.89)  (3.03)  (0.14)
Main economic activity females: NAG  -0.485  .0.188  -0.109
(1.58)  (1.35)  (0.69)
% irrigated area  0 006  0.003**  0.000
(1.50)  (2.01)  (0.10)
Cropping intensity:  I crop/year  0.803  0.339*  0.164
(1.85)  (1.73)  (0.71)
Grameen Bank in the village  0,877*  0.198  -0.153
(1.90)  (1.17)  (0.54)
Krishi  Bank in the village  -0.275  -0.195  0.069
(0.55)  (1.12)  (0.33)
Area village per household  0.029  0.014  0.016
(0.22)  (0.23)  (0.29)
Shock: natural disaster  0.163  0.139  0.204
10.52)  (1.01)  (1.41)
Shock: epicemic/pests  0.964**  0.356**  0.208
i3.20)  - (2.67)  (1.39)
36Modernization/openness
Road to the village unpaved  -0.028  0.026  -0.174
(0.11)  (0.22)  (1.26)
Telephone in the village  -0.347  -0.032  -0.188
(0.69)  (0.14)  (0.79)
Distance to Thana  -0.006  0.001  0.009
(0.22)  (0.09)  (0.53)
Distance to Dhaka  0.001  0.000  -0.002**
(0.72)  (0.32)  (2.08)
Instittttions
Poor Cooperative Society  -0.114  -0.031  -0.151
(0.44)  (0.27)  (1.39)
Club/recreation in village  0.069  0.024  -0.113
(0.27)  (0.21)  (0.72)
Constant  -3.211  -1.57"  0.028
(2.60)  (2.72)  (0.02)
Pseudo R 2 0.189
Wald  X2  56.55  66.72
(p-value)  (0.003)  (0.0001)
Note: Figures  in parentheses  are asymptotic  t-ratios. 186 observations;  141 censored.  Tobit estimates are based
on Huber/White  standard errors. (I)First  stage regressions  for landholdings,  adult illiteracy  and low profession  are
available upon request: they include, in addition to the regressors above,  the inter-quartile  range for land, the
Wolfson  polarization  index and an indicator  of net transfers  to the poor in the community  as instruments.  The F -
test (F(3,161)and  p-values) for the joint significance of the instruments  in the I"  stage are 1.61 (0.189), 4.35
(0.005) and 1.80 (0.149)  respectively.  The X
2
(3)  (and p-value) for the joint significance  of the lst stage residuals
in the LIML  regression  is 13.63  (0.003).
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